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Afalicious abuse of judicial process can only be made the ground
of an action for damages when the person aggrieved has been arrested
or his property seized ; bad faith in prosecuting the proceedings,
even though resulting in injury to business or good name, is not
abuse of process: Bartlett v. Christhelf, Ct. App. Md., June 13,
1888.
BANKS.

Deposit cannot be alleged by the bank to belong to another when
it has received the deposit and credited the depositor on its books;
this is an implied contract to honor the depositor's check, and it is
clearly against public policy to permit the bank te refuse the check
for such a reason in the absence of an attachment by a creditor or a
demand by the true owner ; hence, where the sureties of a county
treasurer, out of precaution, required his deputy to open an account
in his own name as " deputy treasurer," this, though an acknowledgment by the depositor that the money was held for some one else not
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named, did not change the ordinary relations between the bank and
a depositor, and would be no ground for refusal to pay his checks:
Citizens' Nat. Bk. v. Alexander, S. Ct. Penna., May 21, 1888.
BILLS AND NOTES.

.iMaker of a draft, which has been cashed by a bank, has only to see
that it is paid and cannot be made liable to the bank after payment,
for any recommendation he may have made to the batik at the time it
was cashed, as to the method of collection: _First .Natl.Bk. of Warren
v. Cadwallader, S. Ct. Penna., May 25, 1888.
Considerationof an indorsement is insufficient to hold the indorser
of a promissory note, when the indorsement is made after the delivery
of the note to the payee, upon the promise of the payee merely to forbear suit against the maker: Lambert v. 07ewley, S. Jud. Ct. Me.,
Aug. 3, 1888.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Attorney fee of $25 cannot be imposed as costs upon a railroad
company who unsuccessfully defends a case: corporations have equal
rights with natural persons and such a law (Pub. Acts 1885, No. 234,
1. R. Co.,
p. 356) is unconstitutional and void: Wilder v. C. 4' tE. R.
S. Ct. Mich., May 18, 1888.
Infectious disease must be reported to the health authorities, where
an ordinance requiring such report is adopted by a city, authorized
by its charter to establish ordinances "relative to the cleanliness and
health of the city" and "any and all other subjects that shall be
deemed necessary and proper for the protection and preservation of
the health, property, and rights of the citizens; such ordinance violates
neither the State nor the U. S. Constitution in not compensating the
physician for the trouble of making such report: State v. rordin, S.
Ct. Errors of Conn., Dec. 1, 1887.
Signing a bill intentionally and understandingly by the governor,
at any place on the bill, is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional provision, that "every bill which shall have passed the Senate
and House of Representatives, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the governor; if he approves it he shall sign it :" National
L. 4- C. Co. v. Head, S. Ct. Yt., July 21, 1888.
Subscription solicitor, a citizen of Missouri, and canvassing for an
Ohio firm for a book shipped from Ohio as the subscription is reported,
cannot be required by the city of Fort Scott, Kansas, to pay a license
tfe under the city ordinance fixing the fees of all book canvassers:
interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all, and this license cannot be
exacted: City q/ _Fort Scott v. Pelton, S. Ct. Kansas, July 7, 1888.
Title of "An Act to Regulate the Manufacture and Sale of Malt,
Brewed, Fermented, Spirituous, and Vinous Liquors in the several
counties in this State," does not express the object of the Act within
the requirements of the State Constitution when that object is to
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prohibit such manufacture and sale in counties when a majority of the
electors so vote: Be Hauck, S. Ct. AIich., May 18, 1888.
CONTRACTS.

The consideration arising from the expenditure of money for the
promissee's own benefit, is sufficient to sustain a promise to repay the
amount expended, and, therefore, an action will be sustained, when
brought by a nephew against his uncle who told him to take a trip to
Europe, promising to reimburse the expense of his return home; the
case is to be distinguished from a promise to make a present or render
gratuitous service, because a burden was incurred at the request of
the promissor: Devecmon v. Shaw, Ct. App. Md., June 13, 1888.
Consideration of a contract is sufficient when it consists of mutual
promises of the respective parties, to contribute equally to the capital
required to carry out an enterprise therein agreed upon, and to share
equally the profits: King et al. v. Barnes et al., Ct. App. N. Y.,
April 10, 1888.
Physician may make a binding contract, unlimited in time, to
refrain from practising in a particular place, and the contract will be
enforced by injunction: French v. Parker, S. Ct. R. I., May 17,
1888.
CRIMINAL LAW.

Courage should not be considered when a plea of self-defence is
interposed; the accused is entitled to show that he is timid, weak, and
cowardly by nature, to establish the honesty of' his alleged belief that
le was in danger of his life or of great bodily harm, and that le
necessarily acted as he did to save himself from the apparent threatened danger: People v. Lennon, S. Ct. 'Mich., July 11, 1888.
Marriageis not to be presumed, and a single woman need not be
proved to be unmarried in an indictment for fornication, unless her
celibacy is drawn into question: Gaunt v. The State, S. Ct. N. J.,
June 20, 1888.
M2lurder is not committed, as accessory, by one who hears two
persons plotting to drive the deceased from the town without intending any serious injury, and then accomlanies the parties to see what
would happen; the fhet that a fight resulted in the death of the
deceased, does not establish that the accused aided and abetted in
the killing: People v. Fay, S. Ct. Mich., May 22, 1888.
EASEMENTS.
Ice may be cut by the owner of land flowed by a mill-dam, so long
as the head of water at the dam is not appreciably diminished: Searle
v. Gardner,S. Ct. Penna., April 23, 1888.
Reservoir to store water is used by a mill owner during the dry
season of three months of the year, to detain water enough to run his
mill for five hours and thereby deprives another miller further down
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the stream of sufficient water for five days, this is an unreasonable use
of the water: the Pennsylvania doctrine, that the uppper mill owner
may detain the water in times of drought until he can advantageously
use it, subject to the decision of the jury as to the reasonableness of
the detention, dissented from: Mason v. Hoyle, S. Ct. Errors, Conn.,
June, 1888.
FIRE INSURANCE.

insurable interest need not be alleged in an action on an insurance
policy; the policy itself is prima facie evidence of such interest
Tabor et al. v. Goss 4 Phillips Man'f'g Co., S. Ct. Colo., June 2,
1888.
Estoppel preventing the insurers from asserting a forfeiture for
breach of warranty, arising from not stating truely the amount of
judgments against the insured, will occur if the insurers after a full
knowledge of the facts causing the breach, subject the insured to the
expense of plans of the building burned and of more fbrmal proofs of
loss than the preliminary proofs, and the delay of an appraisement,
until nearly a year had elapsed, without informing him of any objection to his claim: Niagara F. I. Co. v. Miller, S. Ct. Penna., May
21, 1888.
LIFE INSURANCE.

Death ensues from bodily injuries effected through external, violent,
and accidental means within such terms of a policy of accident insurance where a person in good health and generally of sound and strong
constitution is driving in a public road and, upon his horse taking
fright and running a considerable distance, in imminent peril of colliding with other teams, the insured exerts himself in controlling
the horse, and immediately afterwards experienced great sickness and
pain, and died in about an hour; if the death was caused by fright
merely, still the act of the horse in running away was the efficient
and true cause of death : McGlinchey et al. v. Fidelity Casualty Co.,
S. Jud. Ct. Me., March 8, 1888.
Tontine policy of life insurance providing that "1all surplus or
profits derived from such policies on the ten-year-dividend system as
shall cease to be in force before the completion of their respective
ten-year-dividend periods shall be apportioned equitably among such
policies of the same class as shall complete their ten-year-dividend
period" gives no title to any specific moneys. The relations of the
insured and the company are not a trust, and the Courts can only
interfere after the company has made a division which is averred to
be inequitable within the meaning of the contract: Uhlman v. N. Y.
Life Ins. Co., Ct. App. N. Y., June 5, 1888.
Wife and children of the insured take in equal shares, though one
of the children has married and lives in another house, where the
certificate of a mutual benefit society declares the fund is payable to
the wife for the benefit of herself and his children without the proportions being prescribed by the certificate or the constitution and by-
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Ia .vs of the society. The widow has no right to decide upon the
amount of each child's share: Jackman v. Nfelson, S. Jud. Ct. Mass.,
June 21, 1888.
LIMITATION.

Absence from the State, which will prevent the running of the
Statute of Limitations; must be such that process cannot be served
on the defendant in such a manner as to bind him personally: the
keeping of a house for his wife, with occasional returns tl)ere, places
the defendant in a position to be served, and his absence will not
stop the running of the statute: Quarles'v. Bicford, S. Ct. N. II.,
March 16, 1888.
MARRIAGE.

Duress, which avoids a marriage cermony, occurs when a young
man of sixteen, is falsely arrested in bastardy proceedings, is greatly
frightened at the thought of being committed to jail for want of bail
before trial, and is advised by his father, who refuses to become bail
for his son, to marry the woman and never live with her: the woman
was old and of bad repute, and the parties never cohabited. The
marriage was annulled: Shoro v. Shoro, S. Ct. Vt., June 11, 1888.
MORTGAGE.

Chattel mortgage of the goods of a boarder in a hotel may be made
by his oral agreement that the goods should remain in the room occupied by him, as security for his unpaid bill: Weil v. .lyus,S. Ct. Ran.,
June 9, 1888.
NEGLIGENCE.

iMfaster is responsible for an injury to an employ6, occasioned by
the joint negligence of the master and the fellow servant : .Faren v.
Sellers, S. Ct. La., December 5, 1887.
Trench dug across a city sidewalk for half of its width, with the
earth thrown up on one side of it to the height of three feet, to make
a sewer connection, is sufficiently guarded against the plaintiff who
approached the trench at half past ten in the morning, observed it,
walked around the bank of earth, and stopping to look into the store
window, stepped backwards into the trench. The plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence: Barnes v. Sowden, S. Ct. Penna., February 27, 1888.
PARTNERSHIP.

Chattel mortgage, substantially covering the stock in trade of the
firm, executed by one partner without the knowledge and consent of
the other partner under a promise from the creditor of a situation, and
just as the firm were about making an assignment for the benefit of
their creditors, is fraudulent and void under the rulings of the Iowa
Courts, preventing one partner, without the assent, express or implied,
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of his copartner, from disposing of the firm property in such manner
as will, ipso facto, take away that control and management without
which tile business cannot be conducted: Osborne v. Barge, U. S.
Circ. Ct. N. Dist. Iowa, May 9, 1888, 35 Fed. Rep. 92.
Surviving partner of an insolvent firm may make a general assignment of the firm's property for the benefit of its creditors, with preferences; the survivor is not a trustee but the legal owner of the
property: Williams v. lVhedon, Ct. App. N. Y., April 24, 1888.
RAILROADS.

Bridge constructed with trestles in 1853 and so maintained until
it backed up the stream in 1883 and, for the first time, destroyed
plaintiff's crops, is not protected by the lapse of more than twenty
years, the time for acquiring a prescriptive right; until the plaintiff
suffered an injury there could be no prescription: Sherlock v. L. N.
A. 4 C. R. R. Co., S. Ct. Ind., May 28, 1888.
Stations for freight or passengers cannot be established by Courts
entertaining a writ of mandamus: an abuse of corporate powers in
captiously withholding convenience from the public, must generally be
redressed by the Legislature; as a general rule, railroad management
cannot be judicially interfered with, unless there is a specific act to
be done in a clear and undoubted manner: People, ex rel., v. C. A.
_R. R. Co., S. Ct. 111., June 16, 1888.
Surety on an injunction bond, given to stay the sale of railroad
rolling stock, under a judgment against the railroad company, is
entitled to be reimbursed out of the proceeds of- the sale of the railroad under a mortgage thereon; the case is a special one, dependent
upon the discretion of the Court under the circumstances that the
trustees of the mortgage might have protected their interest in the
rolling stock by filing a foreclosure bill and obtaining an injunction
and a receiver, but did not, and permitted the railroad and the surety
to act for their benefit: Union Trust Co. v. Morrison, S. Ct. U. S.,
April 2, 1888, 125 U. S. 591.
Through bill of lading, with a deposit on account of the freight,
issued by the first of several connecting carriers, amounts to an
engagement not only to carry over that carrier's line, but also so to
deliver the goods to the next carrier as to create the same obligation
in the second carrier: consequently, where the connecting carriers had
agreed that neither would consider goods as delivered by the other to
it, unless freight charges were prepaid or guaranteed on the way bill,
the first carrier remains liable to the consignor until this agreement is
carried out, though physically the goods have been placed in the station
of the second carrier: Palmer v. C. B.
Q. R. R. Co., S. Ct. Err.
Conn., April, 1888.
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TRADE.MARK.

NTame of a person cannot be made a trademark by him, even with

the addition of the word "improved," when lie has used his name as
a description of an article of his own manufacture and has sold the
trademark with the business of such manufacture: Adams v. .lessenger, S. Jud. Ct. Mass., June 19, 1888.
Title to a trademark does not arise from adopting some mark, not
in use to distinguish goods of the same class or kind already on the
market, and the public declaration that such mark would be applied
to goods to be put on the market in the future ; the goods must be
actually on the market marked with the particular mark: Schneider
v. lWilliams, Ct. Chan. N. J., July 24, 1888.
U. S. COURTS.

Jtrisdictionof cases involving less than $500, wherein the U. S.
are plaintiffs, was not vested in the U. S. Circuit Courts by Rev. Stat.
§ 629, giving them original jurisdiction, "of all suits at common law,
where the U. S. or any officer thereof, suing under the authority of
any Act of Congress, are parties," tind any uncertainty was removed
by § 1 of the Act of 1875, substantially continued in the Amendatory
Act, March 3, 1887 (24 Stat. U. S. 552) ; the U. S. must go into the
State Courts if such small amounts are to be litigated: U. S. v. Rdffmaster, U. S. Circ. Ct. N. D. Cal., May 21, 1888, 35 Fed. Rep. 81, 83.
Removal of a cause from a State Court, Qn the ground of prejudice
or local influence, since the Act of 1887, cannot be made by filing an
affidavit of belief of such prejudice: the fact of inability to obtain
justice in the State Court must be established by an affidavit Ar otherwise: Short v. C. Al. 4r St. P. R. R. Cb., U. S. Cire. Ct. Dist. Blinn.
March 12, 1888, 34 Fed. Rep. 225.
Temoval may take place where a citizen of Massachusetts files a
bill in a State Court of New York against a Connecticut corporation
and a New York corporation, praying fbr damages and an accounting
by the Connecticut corporation only. There is a separable controversy, which the Connecticut corporation might remove to the U. S.
Circ. Ct. under the provisions of the Act of 1887: Final v. Continental Construc. and Imp. Co., U. S. Circ. Ct. N. Dist. N. Y. March
19, 1888, 34 Fed. Rep. 228.
WILLS.
Charity, such as the Courts will recognize, cannot be created by a
devise of the rest and residue of the testator's estate to Henry George,
for the free distribution of such of his works as he may think proper;
the Court, considering that certain passages in such works to be a
denunciation of secure title to land in private individuals, held this
clause of the will to be void: Hutchins' Exr. v. George, Ct. Chan.
N. J., May 21, 1888.
JOHN B. UHLE.

